

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03969

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TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: ISI SUBGROUP MEETING, MARCH 13

CTB MESSAGE NO.172

1. SUMMARY: TURNBULL (US) ASKED FOR SOVIET DEL COMMENTS ON SEISMIC ARRAY INSTALLATIONS AND WHETHER THEY ENVISIONED PROVISION OF CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATED DATA IN NEAR REAL TIME FROM INTERNAL STATIONS. SOFRONOV (USSR) DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF ARRAYS BUT THOUGHT STATION LOCATIONS SHOULD BE AGREED FIRST. ON COMMUNICATIONS, SOFRONOV TENTATIVELY SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR PROVIDING DATA ONLY IF REQUESTED FOR A SPECIFIC EVENT DETECTED BY NTM. FAKLEY (UK) PRESSED SOVIET DEL FOR ADDITIONAL CLARIFYING DETAIL ON ALL ASPECTS OF INTERNAL STATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. SOFRONOV OPENED ISI SUBGROUP MEETING BY SAYING SOVIET DEL HAD NO STATEMENT TO MAKE BUT WAS READY TO ANSWER
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QUESTIONS ON THEIR PROPOSAL FOR "BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION" FROM INTERNAL STATIONS. TURNBULL NOTED THAT SOVIET DEL HAD NOT COMMENTED ON US PRESENTATIONS ON ARRAYS AND ASKED FOR COMMENTS. SOFRONOV REPLIED THAT THE NEED FOR ARRAYS SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF THE TASKS THAT WERE SET FOR INTERNAL STATIONS. WHILE ARRAYS COULD BE CONSIDERED IF CONDITIONS EXISTED AT SPECIFIC

SITES WHICH JUSTIFIED THEM, HE COULD NOT THINK OF ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE ARRAYS WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. SOFRONOV ALSO FELT THAT THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF ARRAY INSTALLATIONS THAT THE US HAD DESCRIBED MIGHT BE EXCESSIVE. WHEN PRESSED AS TO WHETHER AN AGREED SET OF CHARACTERISTICS FOR ARRAYS COULD BE DEVELOPED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, SOFRONOV SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL FIRST TO AGREE ON WHERE STATIONS SHOULD BE LOCATED. THE SOVIET DEL HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE SPECIFIC STATION LOCATIONS PROPOSED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL DATA EXCHANGE BE USED. IF THE US AGREED TO THESE, THEN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STATION DESIGN COULD BE DISCUSSED. TURNBULL ARGUED IT WAS LOGICAL TO AGREE ON CHARACTERISTICS OF STATIONS PRIOR TO DISCUSSION OF STATION LOCATIONS, WHILE SOFRONOV CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT LOCATIONS BE AGREED FIRST.

3. TURNBULL THEN ASKED IF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR BI-LATERAL DATA EXCHANGE FROM INTERNAL STATIONS ALLOWED FOR PROVISION OF AUTHENTICATED DATA CONTINUOUSLY AND IN NEAR REAL TIME. SOFRONOV FIRST ANSWERED IN GENERAL TERMS, SAYING THAT SOVIET DEL PROPOSALS AS FORMULATED ON MARCH 8 (CTB MESSAGE NO. 165) WERE ADEQUATE TO MEET STATED US REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDED FOR FLEXIBILITY TO ALLOW CHANGES BASED ON TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. SPECIFIC DETAILS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC). WHEN TURNBULL INSISTED THAT THE NATURE OF DATA

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TRANSMISSION WAS A FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT WHICH HAD TO BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED, SOFRONOV OFFERED, BY WAY OF "THINKING ALOUD", WHAT HE CALLED ONE POSSIBLE METHOD OF EXCHANGING DATA. IF ALL AGREED THAT DATA FROM INTERNAL STATIONS WAS SUPPLEMENTARY TO NTM, THERE WOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT FOR A CONTINUOUS FLOW OF DATA. INTERNAL STATIONS WOULD BE DESIGNED TO HELP IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS WHICH REMAINED AMBIGUOUS ON THE BASIS OF NTM ALONE. THE INTERNAL STATIONS WOULD RECORD AUTHENTICATED SEISMIC DATA CONTINUOUSLY. IF THE OTHER PARTY HAD A SPECIFIC EVENT WHICH REMAINED AMBIGUOUS AFTER APPLICATION OF NTM, THEY COULD REQUEST THAT AN AUTHENTICATED WAVEFORM FOR THE EVENT BE PROVIDED.

4. TURNBULL REACTED STRONGLY TO THIS SUGGESTION, POINTING OUT A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY SUGGESTED PROCEDURE WAS INADEQUATE. HE STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE COMPLEX, LEAD TO A LARGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR DATA, AND COULD RESULT IN CONTINUING IRRITATIONS. SOFRONOV SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT ARGUMENTS AND OTHER WAYS TO SOLVE PROBLEM. HE FELT TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THIS SORT WOULD BE EASY TO SOLVE IF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING PROVISION

FOR INTERNAL STATIONS WERE AGREED. HE REITERATED THAT WITHOUT A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE STATIONS WOULD BE, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET DEL TO AGREE ON OTHER POINTS.

5. FAKLEY (UK) EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SOVIET DEL WAS NOT PREPARED TO EXPAND FURTHER ON AND CLARIFY THEIR PROPOSALS OF MARCH 8. HE REVIEWED SOVIET POSITION, NOTING THAT WHILE THE US DEL HAD MADE DETAILED PROPOSALS ON EACH POINT, THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE EXPLANATION OF SOVIET

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VIEWS.

6. SOFRONOV RESPONDED BY REVIEWING ELEMENTS OF SOVIET DEL POSITION. FIRST, SOVIET DEL HAD MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR STATION LOCATIONS, BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED US RESPONSE. SECOND, WHILE THE US HAD MADE PROPOSALS ON STATION CHARACTERISTICS, THESE COULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED SEPARATELY FROM THE QUESTION OF STATION PLACEMENT. THIRD, THE SOVIET DEL HAD ACCEPTED THE US PROPOSAL THAT DATA BE AUTHENTICATED. THE SOV DEL DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING THE US DEL AUTHENTICATION METHOD, BUT THIS WAS A TECHNICAL ISSUE WHICH COULD BE DECIDED LATER. FINALLY, ON DATA TRANSMISSION, SOVIET DEL WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY TURNBULL'S COMMENTS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, SOFRONOV THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SEVERAL DIFFERENT METHODS OF COMMUNICATION. TASK OF WORKING THIS

OUT COULD BE LEFT FOR THE JCC.

7. IN CONVERSATION SUBSEQUENT TO MEETING, BELOV (USSR)
TOLD PHELPS (US) THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE SCHEME FOR
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PROVIDING DATA ONLY ON REQUEST WHICH HAD BEEN OUTLINED
BY SOFRONOV WOULD, IN FACT, BE FINAL SOVIET POSITION.
IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, TURNBULL ASKED SOFRONOV WHAT THE
SOVIETS HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY REFERRED TO ISI'S EFFECT
ON "NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS". SOFRONOV REPLIED THERE
WERE BOTH POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL CONCERNS. THE CONCEPT
OF DATA FLOWING DIRECTLY TO ANOTHER COUNTRY WAS VERY
SENSITIVE FOR THE SOVIETS, EVEN IF BOTH PARTIES RECEIVED
THE DATA AT THE SAME TIME. SOFRONOV SAID THERE WAS A
BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT STATIONS INSIDE THE USSR AND DATA
FLOW FROM THEM MUST BE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL. THE SOVIET
TECHNICAL CONCERN WAS THAT ISI MIGHT PICK UP OTHER
INTELLIGENCE, SUCH AS "ROCKET LAUNCHES." TURNBULL SAID
THE US HAD NO DESIRE FOR THIS KIND OF INFORMATION, AND
THAT IT WAS THE HOST COUNTRY'S RESPONSIBILITY AS PART OF
THE JOINT SITING PROCEDURES TO MAKE SURE ALL FORMS OF
CULTURAL ACTIVITY WERE MINIMIZED. CULTURAL NOISE OF ANY
TYPE WOULD BE AN IRRITANT TO THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE
STATION. SOFRONOV SAID THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN HELPFUL.
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